The role of migrants' networks in promoting cross border investments has been stressed in the literature, possibly making migration and FDI complements rather than substitutes in the long run. In this paper, we estimate the magnitude of such business network externalities in dynamic empirical models of FDI-funded capital accumulation. We use original data on capital and migration stocks rather than ‡ows. Regarding migrants, we distinguish the total and the skilled diasporas abroad. In both cross-sectional and panel frameworks, we …nd evidence of strong network externalities, mainly associated to the skilled diaspora. These network externalities are stronger for countries exhibiting intermediate corruption index.
Introduction
For the last decades, the pace of international migration has accelerated. According to the United Nations, the number of international migrants increased shows that the global impact of skilled migration on human capital is ambiguous.
Network or diaspora externalities constitute an additional channel through which migration a¤ects source countries. By creating trust, providing market information and reducing transaction costs, the diaspora abroad acts as promoting trade, investment and technology adoption in the origin country. The purpose of our paper is to evaluate the magnitude of these "business network" externalities on foreign direct investment (FDI). In a global context, FDI in ‡ows constitute a major source of capital accumulation and technology di¤usion in developing countries. As suggested by various sectoral studies, the diaspora impact is likely to be linked to the presence of skilled migrants abroad. As a result, a bene…cial brain drain can be obtained, even when depressing the average level of schooling in the emigration country.
Using an original data set on emigration stocks by educational attainment and FDI-funded capital stock, we empirically evaluate the relationship between FDI, the size and the educational structure of the diaspora. Our empirical study has three important characteristics:
² First, it relies on two original sources of data. Regarding FDI, we use a classical inventory method to evaluate the FDI-funded stock of capital per worker in a large number of countries. As FDI ‡ows are very volatile and can hardly be interpreted in the long-run (long-run equilibria are usually de…ned in terms of stocks), working on stock data is much better than working on ‡ows. Regarding migration, we distinguish skilled and unskilled migrants and, contrary to previous studies, we also use migration stocks instead of ‡ows. We rely on a new comprehensive and consistent data set on international migration by educational attainment, that describes the loss of skilled workers to the OECD for all countries in 1990
and 2000 (see Docquier and Marfouk, 2006) . Our analysis of business network is the …rst that distinguishes the role of migrants' education.
² Second, we compare cross-section and panel elasticities. Our analysis is guided by the availability of migration data. As migration stocks are only e¤ects of similar intensity.
² Finally, instead of relying on bilateral data, our analysis is based on the aggregate stock of FDI-funded capital received by the world countries.
Several reasons motivate our choice. Bilateral FDI data are only available for limited pairs of countries or for limited periods. Considering aggregate FDI in ‡ows allows computing the total stock of capital and save us modeling the competition and/or coordination between foreign investors.
In addition, since international migrants are strongly concentrated in one or two OECD countries, our analysis can be viewed as bilateral analysis between all the world countries and their main OECD partners.
We …nd evidence of important network externalities. Our analysis con…rms that business networks are mostly driven by skilled migration. The elasticity of the FDI-funded capital growth rate to skilled migration is between 2 and 3 percent. Hence, the size of the diaspora matters. The recent literature on the brain drain reveals the human capital response to skilled migration is likely to be positive in large countries characterized by low rates of migration. This paper brings an additional channel through which large countries may bene…t from skilled migration: having a large educated diaspora abroad stimulates physical capital accumulation. On the other hand, small countries are less likely to bene…t from skilled migration. Finally, we show that diaspora externalities are stronger in countries where corruption is not too high and not too low. Gao (2003) and Tong (2003) .
Why would diasporas be important in promoting international trade and investments? Rauch (2003) stresses two major channels through which the diaspora could promote international trade and investments . First, it creates (or substitutes for) trust in a weak international legal environment. Co-ethnic networks provide community enforcement of sanctions to deter opportunism and violations of contracts. If a party acts opportunistically, then its reputation would su¤er within that network. Second, the diaspora provides market information or supplies matching and referral services. Co-ethnic networks can promote trade because they are familiar with the market needs in their country of origin. They can provide important information to foreign investors, which may otherwise be di¢cult or costly to obtain. In addition, they reduce communication barriers: migrants know the language, the culture, the values, the law and the practices of their home country. They know the way of thinking of their compatriots and they better understand who is well to trust or not to trust being more aware of potential business partners. The channels just described seem to apply mainly to skilled migrants, as it is con…rmed by various sectoral case-studies, notably in the case of the software industry (Saxenian, 1999 , 2001 , Arora and Gambardella, 2004 .
A few empirical studies aimed at measuring the magnitude of the diaspora externality. In his study on the role of ethnic Chinese networks in attracting FDI, Gao (2003) considered both the population share of ethnic Chinese and the log of the absolute population of ethnic Chinese in the source country.
In a gravity model framework, Tong (2003) studied the role of ethnic Chinese in promoting bilateral investments by using the product of the numbers of ethnic
Chinese in pairs of countries in 1990.
Focusing on the mechanisms trough which NAFTA-related variables might work to reduce migration to the US, Aroca and Maloney (2004) used data on migration ‡ows from and within Mexico without distinguishing between skilled and unskilled migrants. They found that both FDI and trade variables are substitutes for labor ‡ows (FDI and trade reduce migration).
In another study on Germany, Buch, Kleiner and Toubal (2003) used data on inward and outward migration of Germans and foreigners. As they could not have information on the stocks of Germans living abroad or on foreigners living in Germany, they computed gross and net stocks of migrants in order to obtain proxies for the community of Germans living abroad and of foreigners living in Germany, respectively. They …nd that FDI are complements to migration:
there is a relatively strong link between the stocks of German migrants and the stocks of German FDI abroad. For the immigration of the foreigners and FDI in ‡ows, the evidence is weaker. They tested also for causality: they found that with regard to outward FDI and emigration of Germans, the causality seems to run from migration to FDI; with regard to FDI in ‡ows and immigration of foreigners, the causality seems to run from FDI to migration.
Only in a more recent study Kugler and Rapoport (2005) Let us consider a small open economy characterized by a production function à la Barro, Mankiw and Sala-I-Martin (1995) :
where A i;t determines the total factor productivity, K i;t is the stock of capital, H i;t is the stock of human capital, N i;t is the size of the labor force and F (:) is the production function, homogenous of degree one (constant returns to scale).
As capital is mobile across countries, the optimal marginal productivity of capital is equal to the international interest rates r ¤ t augmented of a countryspeci…c risk premium ¼ i;t . This gives
K is homogenous of degree zero, the …rst order condition determines the optimal quantity of capital per worker, k ¤ i;t , and the optimal capital stock, K ¤ i;t : 
Taking logs and working in units of labor, we have:
where m i;t is one plus the growth rate of the labor force.
The log-ratio of physical capital is then given by the following equation
Several elements determining the optimal level of capital are endogenous:
² Network e¤ects in ‡uence the country-risk premium. Denoting by M i;t the total number of migrants and by h M i;t the share of high-skill among migrants, we can write
where Risk i;t is an indicator of economic and political climate that can be captured by the democracy index, the corruption perception index, political instability, etc.
² The total factor productivity is likely to depend on human capital (according to the Schumpeterian model of technology di¤usion), lagged physical capital per worker (under learning by doing), the population size and growth rate (due to increasing returns) and variables capturing the economic and political climate:
² The average level of schooling could also be treated as endogenous.
Plugging all these e¤ects into (3), we obtain the following¯-convergence empirical model: ² a 2 captures the e¤ect of human capital on capital accumulation: the e¤ect is ambiguous. On the one hand, the proportion of high-skill workers has a positive e¤ect on labor productivity. On the other hand, it is more and more usual to relocate part of the production process in countries endowed in unskilled labor when the cost of labor is low;
² a 3 and a 4 capture the dilution e¤ect of population growth and size as well as the market size. We expect dilution e¤ect to play negatively on capital per worker: since capital adjustments take time, a rise in the labor force has a negative impact on capital per worker in the short-run. However, a large labor force or a high population growth rate induces an increasing market size which is more attractive for investments;
² a 5 measures the intensity of the migration business network. We expect a positive sign if network e¤ects are signi…cant;
² a 6 determines the importance of high-skill workers in determining the business network externality. We expect a positive estimate;
² a 7 controls for the political environment;
² a 8 is a vector of parameters associated to a set of addition controls X i;t , ² ² i;t is the residual.
In Section 5, this empirical model will be applied to data on the FDI-funded stock of capital. In Section 6, we will use a panel regression model.
Are migration and FDI substitutes or complements? From equation (4), the general impact of migration on capital accumulation is quite di¢cult to evaluate. Using K i;t = k i;t :N i;t ,we have:
Obviously, a new migrant (leaving her country between t ¡ 1 and t) induces a one-for-one decrease in N i;t and a one-for-one increase in M i;t . Older migrants (who left before t ¡ 1) impacted on N i;t¡1 and in turn on K i;t¡1 . Migration also a¤ects the structure of the labor force (h i;t ), the education structure of the network (h M i;t ) and the growth rate of the labor force (m i;t ). Therefore, deriving the global impact of contemporaneous migration on capital is a complex task.
Hence, we will not address the issue of global substitutability or complementarity between migration and FDI. Our purpose will only be to check for the existence of network e¤ects in capital accumulation and to examine whether such diaspora relationships are skill biased.
Data issues
In this section, we describe the data used to test the relationship between the diaspora size and the foreign capital stock in activity. In particular, we describe how we have built measures for the capital stock per worker (FDI-funded or total) and for the network size (by educational attainment).
Capital stock data. Data on foreign direct investments and the gross formation of physical capital are taken from the World Development Indicators.
Regarding FDI, this data set gives the total in ‡ows by country, abstracting from the origin of the in ‡ows and the type of FDI. Hence, our analysis will focus on the diaspora impact on aggregate FDI in ‡ows rather than on bilateral exchanges. In addition, we will not distinguish between vertical FDI that aim at relocating a part of the activity, and horizontal FDI that aim at launching a good on a new market. Tables 1 and 2 give a broad pictures of the data. We compute the average growth rate of FDI and the share of FDI in total investment by income group, by region of particular interest and by level of corruption. Regarding corruption, we distinguish four groups of equal size according to the quartiles of the distribution. The …rst group is made of countries whose corruption index is less than or equal to 2.4; the second group by countries with a level comprised between 2.4 and 3.3; the third one with a level comprised between 3.3 and 5.8, the fourth, the less corrupted one, with a level higher than 5.8. Table 1 compares the average annual growth rate of FDI and total investments evaluated in constant 1995 $US between 1980 and 2000. With globalization, the growth rate of FDI have been much stronger than the growth rate of total investments in the last twenty years, except in the early nineties. Strong disparities can be observed across groups of countries. High growth rates are observed in high-income, OECD countries, comforting the fact that economic activity tends to concentrate where initial productivity if high, i.e. where human capital is high or where the number of …rms is large. However, as many stages of the production process can be relocated in countries where the cost of labor 4 For a more precise de…nition see Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004 is low and as new markets are emerging all around the world, other less developed countries have also bene…ted from large investments. FDI grew rapidly in low-income countries in the early eighties and nineties, especially in Asian countries. Sub-Saharan and Latin American countries also exhibit high growth rates in the early nineties. It is also worth noticing that FDI growth rates have been stronger in less corrupted, especially in the early stages of globalization. Tab 1. Average annual growth rate of FDI and total investment 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-2000 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995- As investment ‡ows are extremely volatile and cannot capture the long-run trends of nations (in the long-run, ‡ows just compensate for depreciation and demographic growth), our analysis is based on stock data. Obviously, there is no data set providing series of capital stock (a fortiori, FDI-funded capital stock)
by country. We thus use investment data to construct capital stock series for 114 countries in 1990 and 2000. We distinguish the FDI-funded capital stock and the total capital stock. We use a classical inventory method based on the standard equation of capital accumulation:
where d is the depreciation rate (…xed at 4 percent a year) and I i;t¡1 is the amount of FDI or total investment alternatively.
We start from an hypothetical long-run value given by 
Empirical analysis
Our general¯-convergence model is given by (4) in which k i;t measures the FDI-funded capital stock per worker in country i at time t. The dependent variable is the average annual real growth rate of k i;t between 1990 and 2000.
Building on (4), we introduce a set of controls X i;t which were shown to in‡uence investment decision in existing empirical studies. As argued by Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004), "explanatory variables can be a vector of …rm and/or industry characteristics, of home country characteristics, of host country characteristics and of bilateral relationships between home and host countries, such as the distance between them. Choice of variable to use depends partly on the hypothesis being investigated and partly on data availability".
To avoid serious multicollinearity problems, we do not incorporate all potential controls simultaneously. We compare several regressions and try to end up with the most reasonable model in which only signi…cant variables are kept. In these regressions, we will consider the corruption index, the democracy index, the distance with two important industrialized regions (the USA and the EU15)
as well as international trade.
Geographical distance can be used as a proxy for trade costs (Gao, 2003) . small. That could be one of the reasons why in the latest years developing countries increased their participation in regional integration scheme.
We will also introduce a dummy variable to underline that high income countries are more attractive for capital investments.
General model. The main results can be summarized as follows:
Convergence speed. In every speci…cation, the estimated coe¢cient of the lagged dependent is highly signi…cant and very stable. We …nd a convergence speed of about 4 percent per year.
Market size. A potentially important determinant of FDI is the market size. Since our dependent variable is capital per worker, the size of the market is neutralized on the left hand-side. Anyway, under increasing returns (which can be related to …xed setup costs), the market size may positively a¤ect the capital stock per worker. In model 1, we control for the log of the working-aged population in 1990 as a proxy to the market size. This variable is not signi…cant.
Similar results were obtained with log of the total population (regression not reported). We did not consider the log of the GDP because of endogeneity problems. There is no evidence of additional market size e¤ect on the right handside. The estimated coe¢cient of the growth rate of the labor force is negative (as expected) but statistically not signi…cant. In separate regressions, to avoid multicollinearity problems, we ran regressions considering the rate of growth of the labor force by skill level: in all cases, this variable is never signi…cant.
Structure of the labor force. The structure of the labor force is potentially important in predicting FDI in ‡ows. As argued in section 2, the proportion of high-skill workers has a positive e¤ect on labor productivity. Nevertheless, part of the production process in countries endowed in unskilled labor when the cost of labor is low. We obtain evidence that the average level of schooling has a positive e¤ect on FDI in ‡ows. However, including the share of high-skill workers causes serious problems of stability given the strong multicollinearity with many variables such as the lagged capital stock per worker. By adding a dummy for high-income countries, we capture the strong attractiveness of human capital.
The coe¢cients are very stable across samples and speci…cations. The coe¢cient for this dummy is positive and generally signi…cant. Network e¤ects. The estimated coe¢cients of the log of the stock of total expatriates and of the share of high skilled migrants are always positive and highly signi…cant. The migration stock is the only signi…cant variable capturing the size of the country. However, given the discussion about the market size, we have strong reasons to believe that such an e¤ect is related to diaspora rather than to market size. For example, in model 1, we consider both the size of the labor force and the stock of expatriates. We obtain a positive diaspora e¤ect despite a strong correlation (0.68 ) between the network size and the labor force (which turns out to be insigni…cant). In further regressions, by excluding the labor force and reducing the risk of multicollinearity, the diaspora e¤ect becomes very signi…cant. Model 4 is our …nest speci…cation with all our statistically signi…cant variables. The elasticity of capital per worker to migration amounts to 1.7 percent. A 10 percentage point rise in the number of migrants increases the growth rate of capital per worker by 1.74 percent. The proportion of skilled migrants is also an important factor of business externality. Our results reveal that business networks are mostly driven by skilled migration. In model 5, we impose diaspora e¤ect to transit through skilled workers and obtain a 2 percent elasticity of capital growth to migration.
In the rest of this section, we start from our best speci…cations (models 4 and 5) and allow for non linear e¤ects. We examine whether the intensity of diaspora externalities varies with the level of corruption and compares the impacts on FDI-funded capital and on the total capital stock per worker.
Business networks and corruption. In the general speci…cation, we exclude corruption for multicollinearity and stability reasons. Let us now examine whether corruption a¤ects the size of diaspora e¤ects. The literature stresses the importance of networks both in weak and strong international legal environment (i.e. corrupted and not corrupted countries). While a good investment climate is likely to be more attractive for FDI, ethnic networks are more likely to be crucial in weak environment, where information costs are higher and where community enforcement of sanctions are important. In countries with clean institutions, the role of ethnic networks consists in limiting information costs.
To capture the relationship between networking and the level of corruption, we classify countries according to their perception corruption index. As in Tables   2 and 3 , the minimal value is 1.5 for the most corrupted countries and 9.7 for the less one. We distinguish four country groups of equal size according to the quartiles of the distribution. The …rst group is made up by countries whose corruption index is less than 2.4; the second group by countries with a level comprised between 2.4 and 3.3; the third one with a level comprised between 3.3 and 5.8, the fourth, the less corrupted one, with a level higher than 5.8.
We create four dummies, one for each group, and then generate four interaction terms by multiplying the log of the total number of the expatriates (or the log of high skilled migrants) by each dummy. These variables are used as predictors in the regressions. Table 4 gives the results. Models 1 and 2 are based on the total number of expatriates and abstract from the skill structure of migrants (to avoid multicollinearity problems); models 3 and 4 are based on the number of skilled expatriates.
Tab 4. Cross-section -diaspora e¤ect by level of corruption All other things being equal, does corruption a¤ect the diaspora externality?
Considering the total number of expatriates, the estimate for the most corrupted countries is 0.011 with a signi…cance level of 10 percent; for the second and third groups, we have respectively 0.013 and 0.014 with a signi…cance level of 5 percent; in the less corrupted countries, the estimated coe¢cient is positive (0.011), but statistically insigni…cant. The latter result deserves an econometric extension. In model 1, the VIF (variance in ‡ation factor) for the four group is 14.61. Usually 10 is the tolerated value. A value greater than 10 can re ‡ect multicollinearity problems and in ‡ated standard errors. As democracy index is correlated to corruption and comes out to be the less signi…cant variable in the regression (signi…cant at 10%), we estimate model 2 by excluding this variable.
Then, the estimated coe¢cient for the less corrupted countries becomes positive and signi…cant at 5% and the VIF has a tolerated value. Anyway, the coe¢cients indicate that network e¤ects are stronger in countries exhibiting an intermediate
Considering the number of skilled expatriates, all the coe¢cients are positive and statistically signi…cant at 5 percent. This result holds with or without controlling for democracy. We obtain the same pro…le than in models 1 and 2. Networks e¤ects play a minor role into the most corrupted countries. The major e¤ect is obtained for the third and the second groups characterized by intermediate corruption levels. We conclude that corruption induces a inverted U-shape impact on networking. Diaspora externalities seems to play a major role in community enforcement of sanction, at least when the country is not too corrupted. On the contrary the role played by ethnic networks is in providing information is weaker (although highly signi…cant) if the level of corruption is very low.
Business network and total investment. For the matter of comparison, we apply our general¯-convergence model (4) to the total stock of physical capital per worker (an alternative measure of k i;t ) rather than to the FDIfunded capital stock per worker. Such an analysis allows us to con…rm the existence of diaspora e¤ect at the global level (the FDI-funded capital stock is a component of the total capital stock) or to highlight some compensating e¤ect due, for example, to an joint increase in FDI in ‡ows and out ‡ows.
Basically, we use the same speci…cations as in table 3. Four interesting results are emerging.
Lower convergence speed. A …rst remarkable result is that we obtain a much slower convergence speed (1.7 percent a year instead of 4 percent) for the total capital stock. Over the period 1990-2000, it seems that FDI movements have been much more rapid than local investments. This can be explained either by the general trend of increasing exchanges between countries (globalization) or by stronger imperfections in capital adjustment.
Imperfections matter. Although globalization is an undeniable phenomenon a¤ecting the openness of the world countries, imperfections on the local market for capital seem to be stronger. Indeed, the growth rate of the population has a negative e¤ect the growth rate of capital per worker, indicating that the total stock of capital adjusts more slowly to demographic changes. We did not …nd evidence of such an e¤ect with FDI-funded capital.
Less sensitivity to trade and political regime. We also note that the impact of the democracy index and of trade are also divided by 3 compared to table 3. The total stock of capital per workers is less sensitive to the economic and political environment.
Smaller diaspora externality. Finally, the network e¤ects are smaller although signi…cant. Compared to table 3, the estimates are divided by 3. This can re ‡ect (i) the fact that the FDI-funded capital stock remains a small fraction of the total capital stock, or (ii) a general tendency towards increased specialization and exchanges between countries. In ‡ows can be partly compensated by out ‡ows.
Panel data analysis
In a cross-section setting, the standard ordinary least square estimator with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors reveals a 2 percent elasticity of the growth rate of the FDI-funded capital stock per worker to the stock of skilled emigrants. These cross-section results can be biased and inconsistent given the dynamic nature of the growth equation. In order to obtain more accurate results, we extend our analysis in a panel setting using a more sophisticated econometric method which take into account the possible endogeneity of explanatory variables and omitted variables. As mentionned above, the quality of the panel data on migration is lower on a large time period. Our objective is to con…rm the existence of business newtork externalities when a robust econometric technique is applied.
There is a large debate about the most accurate methodology to estimate growth equations (see Islam, 1993 , Caselli et alt, 1996 , Barghava and Sargan, 1983 , Bhargava et al, 2003 . Here, we use a GMM system estimator for dynamic panel data model. This technique exploits both the cross-sectional and the time dimension of the data. It accounts for unobserved …xed e¤ects. It controls for the potential endogeneity of all the explanatory variables and allows for the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable.
Econometric methodology. Let us brie ‡y present the technique used.
Consider the simpli…ed version of the regression equation (4) in which all explanatory variables (except the lagged dependent) are grouped:
where X it represents the set of the explanatory variables other than the lagged dependent,´i represents the unobserved country-speci…c …xed e¤ect, " it is the error term.
This equation can be re-written in the standard dynamic panel form
A general approach to estimate such an equation is to use a transformation that removes unobserved e¤ects and that uses for instrumental variables. Anderson and Hsiao (1992) propose to work with …rst di¤erences and then to search for instruments. They proposed for the lagged dependent either the two period lagged di¤erence or the two period lagged level of the dependent variable. A generalization of that method was proposed by Arellano-Bond (1991) .
They suggest using the entire set of instruments in a GMM procedure to reach signi…cant e¢ciency gains.
Di¤erentiating (5) yields
in which the unobserved country …xed e¤ect is eliminated.
By construction the error term estimates can be seriously biased. To overcome these problems Bond et al. (2001) suggest to use a more informative set of instruments within the framework developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . We use this new estimator that combines the regression in di¤erences with the regression in levels in a single system . The instruments used in the …rst di¤erentiated equation are the same as above, but the instruments for the equation in level are the lagged di¤erences of the corresponding variables.
For the level equation the following moments condition are to be satis…ed:
The validity of the instruments can be tested using a Sargan-Hansen overidenti…cation test (that is a speci…cation test) and a test on the serial correlation of the error term (see Arellano and Bond (1991) , Arellano and Bover (1995) , Blundell and Bond (1998),Bond, Hoeer and Temple (2001) ) 5 .
Empirical results. The period of analysis is divided into 4 sub periods of 5 year each (1980-85, 1985-90, 1990-95, 1995-00 Starting from the best cross-section speci…cation (model 4 and 5 in Table   3 ), System GMM, Robust two-step; t-statistic in parenthesis * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The main results can be summarized as follows:
Convergence speed. In every speci…cation, the estimated coe¢cient of the lagged dependent variables is highly signi…cant. We …nd a slower convergence speed than in the cross section analysis (about 3 percent per year instead of 4 percent). A possible explanation is that OLS estimates are biased upwards since the lagged dependent variable captures country-speci…c e¤ects. Here it is instrumented.
Market size, structure of the labour force and attractiveness of the country.
Working on the capital per worker, the size of the market is implictly neutralized on the left-hand side. As in the cross-section, the e¤ect of the growth rate of the labour force is not statistically signi…cant. As we can control for endogeneity, we use an alternative measure of the market size, the log of GDP per capita: the coe¢cient associated to that variable is positive but not statistically signi…cant.
This variable is very correlated with the lagged dependent and with interaction terms (for high income dummy and its interactions with democracy and trade openness, the correlations respectively amount to 0.7166, 0.7115 and 0.7769) 7 .
Also the high income dummy alone is not statistically signi…cant and it has not the right sign; it is very correlated with its interaction terms. Network e¤ects. The estimated coe¢cient of the log of the stock of the total number of expatriates and of the share of high skilled workers are positive and statistically signi…cant. The magnitude of the coe¢cient, at least for the log of the total stock of migrants, is in general higher than in the cross-section analysis (2.5 to 3 percent, instead of 2 percent). Also the log of the high skilled is 7 We prefer the model with the High Income dummy to the model with GDP per capita since GDP per capita exhibit a strong correlation with other regressors. Hence, standard errors can be in ‡ated. Moreover, the two-step estimated covariance matrix of moment conditions was singular in model 2. The number of instruments may be large relative to the number of groups. A generalized inverse must be used to calculate optimal weighting matrix in the two-step estimation.
positive and statistically signi…cant. This conforts the results of the cross-section analysis.
Time dummies. We include in each regression the year time dummies to allow for aggregate time e¤ects that have the same in ‡uence on the dependent variable for all countries. Time dummies are positive and in general statistically signi…cant.
Time stability of diaspora externalities. We added time dummies in each regression to capture aggregate time e¤ects (a change in the constant over time) that seem to play an important role in explaining the data. It is worth investigating whether the magnitude of network externalities has increased over time. In Table 7 , we allow also for interactions between migration stocks and the time dummies 8 . We started the analysis considering the general case with time dummies and interaction terms. Since the time dummies were not signi…cant (and the interaction terms too), we then ran the regressions without considering separated time dummies 9 .In that case, interaction terms become statistically signi…cant (see both the individual t-statistic and the F-test for the joint signi…cance). It suggests that the diaspora externality increased in the nineties.
Tab 7. Panel -Speci…cation with time interaction terms
Dependent variable = Growth rate of the FDI-funded capital stock per worker Arel-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences-Pr > z 0,372 0,381 0,375 0,394 Interaction terms (P-value) 0,0103 0,005 Note: System GMM, Robust two-step; t-statistic in parenthesis * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate a dynamic empirical model of FDI-funded capital accumulation. In a cross-section model focusing on the period 1990-2000, our sample of 114 countries reveals the existence of strong network e¤ects, mainly associated to the skilled diaspora. These network e¤ects are stronger in democratic countries as well as in countries exhibiting intermediate corruption index.
Very corrupted regimes face strong di¢culties to attract foreign investments.
In a panel extension with 83 countries and 4 periods of 5 years, we con…rm the existence of business network externalities. The elasticity of the capital growth rate to the stock of skilled emigrants is between 2 and 3 percent. ² Arellano, M. and O. Bover (1995) , Another Look at the Instrumental Variable
